Navigating Technology Competence in Transactional Practice by Johnson, Lori D.
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law 
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship 
2020 
Navigating Technology Competence in Transactional Practice 
Lori D. Johnson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, and the Legal Profession 
Commons 
This Article is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law, an institutional repository administered by 
the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact 
david.mcclure@unlv.edu. 
Johnson: Navigating Technology Competence In Transactional Practice
20201
NAVIGATING TECHNOLOGY COMPETENCE IN
TRANSACTIONAL PRACTICE
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ABSTRACT
In 2012, the American Bar Association House of Delegates, based on
the work of the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, amended the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) to include a new require-
ment concerning lawyer competence. The obligation, enacted as Com-
ment 8 to existing Model Rule 1.1 (outlining a lawyer's requisite
competence) (Rule 1.1), requires lawyers "keep abreast of changes in the
law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with rele-
vant technology." To date, Comment 8 to Rule 1.1 (Comment 8 or the
Comment) has been adopted in thirty-eight states, and has begun generat-
ing scholarship and debate as to its enforcement, efficacy, and extent.
However, very little has been written regarding the requirements of Com-
ment 8 on transactional lawyers. Nor have scholars considered how the
increased efficiencies that might be fostered by Comment 8 could increase
the marketability and reach of transactional lawyers to traditionally under-
represented groups, including entrepreneurs and small businesses. This
Article will examine the potential benefits and risks of technology compe-
tence in transactional lawyering, provide workable guidelines for compli-
ance in the quickly changing landscapes of legal technology and deal-
making, and propose that the ABA provide additional guidance.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas-William S.
Boyd School of Law. The author is indebted to Bob Ambrogi, Ross Guberman,
Kevin O'Keefe, Professor Cynthia M. Adams, Professor Youngwoo Ban, the
attendees of the 2019 Association of Legal Writing Directors Scholarship
Workshop, the attendees of 2019 Sirico Scholars' Workshop, research assistants
Elise Conlin and Daniel Brady, and the transactional lawyers who provided helpful
insight.
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INTRODUCTIONIN the 1980s, the aviation industry faced a panic over concerns that in-
creases in airline technology would make the human pilot irrelevant.
Pilots worried about job losses2 as the monitoring capabilities of the Boe-
ing 747-400 eradicated the requirement for an in-flight engineer by 1989,
reducing flight crews by one third.3 Nonetheless, by 1995 employment
projections showed airline pilots and flight engineers as the fastest grow-
ing sector of the U.S. transportation economy.4 Fast-forward to today, and
airlines are bemoaning pilot shortages the world over.5 Certainly, today's
pilot shortage can be attributed in part to reductions in pay and benefits,
but this vignette demonstrates how the often-false specter of "technologi-
cal unemployment"6 impacts every industry. The legal industry is not
immune.
How has the legal industry responded to growing fears concerning
lawyerjob loss, automation, and outsourcing? According to scholars study-
ing technology use in the legal profession, certain lawyers have clung to an
"'old ways are best' mentality,"7 due to their propensity to "seek equilib-
rium in the status quo and resist change."8 However, a growing body of
scholarship suggests that remaining rooted in their old ways poses dangers
for lawyers.9 This is especially true in a legal landscape where clients and
courts expect, and in some cases require, tech-adept practitioners. These
concerns have been echoed outside the legal academy by legal technology
experts like Bob Ambrogi. Ambrogi has aptly noted that lawyers who
1. See Len Morgan, The Job Market: Airline Hiring on the Comeback Trail, AIRLINE
MAGAZINE, July 1984, at 18 (discussing press coverage of pilot job losses and the
perceived "bleak outlook" for pilot jobs).
2. Id.
3. Nigel Moll, A Centuy in Review: The 1980s, AINONLINE (Aug. 6, 2008, 6:53
AM), https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/aviation-international-news/
2008-08-06/century-review-1980s [https://perma.cc/JB-SNN9].
4. See George T. Silvestri & John M. Lukasiewicz, Occupational eEmployment Pro-
jections: The 1984-95 Outlook, in BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT PROJEC-
TIONS FOR 1995: DATA AND METHODS 41, 55 (1986).
5. Marisa Garcia, A 'Perfect Storm'Pilot Shortage Threatens Global Aviation, FORBES
(July 27, 2018, 6:09 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/marisagarcia/2018/07/
27/a-perfect-storm-pilot-shortage-threatens-global-aviation-even-private-jets/
#34169ecfl549 [https://perma.cc/VS8K-ZFR6].
6. John Maynard Keynes popularized this term in the 1930's, defining it as
"unemployment due to our discovery of means of economising the use of labour
outrunning the pace at which we can find new uses for labour." John Maynard
Keynes, Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren, in ESSAYS IN PERSUASION 358, 364
(1963).
7. Antigone Peyton, Kill the Dinosaurs, and Other Tips for Achieving Technical
Competence in Your Law Practice, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 7, *1 (2015).
8. Michael Simon, Alvin F. Lindsay, Loly Sosa & Paige Comparato, Lola v.
Skadden and the Automation of the Legal Profession, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH 234, 238
(2018).
9. See, e.g., Peyton, supra note 7, at 3.
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maintain a Luddite mentality are burying their heads in the sand, rather
than drawing lines in it.10
For its part, the American Bar Association (ABA) has responded to
the rapid advances in legal technology by amending the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (Model Rules)1 1 to add a technology competence
requirement as Comment 8 (Comment 8 or the Comment) to Model Rule
1.1 (Rule 1.1).12 The widespread adoption of Comment 8 has been identi-
fied by Ambrogi as one of the most important recent developments in the
field of legal technology.13 The question of Comment 8's efficacy in en-
couraging lawyers to become skilled in relevant technologies 4 remains
unanswered, along with related questions concerning adoption and en-
forcement of Comment 8 nationwide and across various legal practice
areas.
Despite the adoption of Comment 8 by a majority of states and an
increase in state ethics opinions interpreting it, nowhere does less clarity
exist concerning the applicability of Comment 8 than in the realm of
transactional lawyering. 15 By analyzing existing enforcement of technol-
10. Bob Ambrogi, New ABA Ethics Rule Underscores Wat EDD Lawyers Should
Already Know: There's No Hiding from Technology, CATALYST REPOSITORY SYS.: E-Dis-
COVERY SEARCH BLOG (Aug. 16, 2012), https://catalystsecure.com/blog/2012/08/
new-aba-ethics-rule-underscores-what-edd-lawyers-should-already-know-theres-no-
hiding-from-technology/ [https://perma.cc/68ZB-RW6B] .
11. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2018) ("To
maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of
changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with
relevant technology, engage in continuing study and education and comply with all
continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject." (emphasis
added)).
12. Please note that across the thirty-eight jurisdictions that have adopted the
Comment, it is occasionally numbered differently. For clarity and ease, the Com-
ment will be referred to as either "Comment 8" where appropriate or "the Com-
ment" when discussed more broadly.
13. Bob Ambrogi, The 20 Most Important Legal Technology Developments of 2018,
LAWSITES (Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.lawsitesblog.com/2018/12/20-important-
legal-technology-developments-2018.html [https://perma.cc/UT7X-K2HB] .
14. Please note that this Article, when discussing relevant technologies, in-
tends to focus on technology used in the practice of law (or within the law office
setting), to produce, create, enhance, submit, file, transmit, and store lawyer work
product. As such, this Article does not intend to focus on the impact of social
media on the legal profession, the use (or misuse) of social media by lawyers, nor
on issues regarding the unethical misuse of technology (such as unauthorized use
of metadata, social media snooping, and the like). To the extent discussion of
these issues is relevant to point out the current focus of ABA and state regulators
in their discussions of technology use by lawyers, these issues may be mentioned.
15. Scholars of transactional drafting and skills have noted that "with limited
exceptions" there are no Model Rules directly on point concerning professional
behavior by transactional lawyers. TINA L. STARK, DRAFTING CONTRACTS: HOW AND
WHY LAwYERs Do WHAT THEY Do 455 (2d ed. 2014). Rather, the Model Rules are
typically enforced against transactional lawyers through analogy to litigation-ori-
ented rules. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 7 (AM. BAR Ass'N
2018) (comparing the buy-sell relationship in transactional practice to directly
adverse parties in litigation, for purpose of determining conflicts of interest).
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ogy competence requirements and associated commentary, this Article en-
deavors to assist transactional lawyers in adapting to a rapidly changing
technological landscape. However, the research shows that a lack of ap-
propriate guidance from the ABA has frustrated the broad purpose of
Comment 8, thereby potentially discouraging lawyers from adopting help-
ful technology, and limiting lawyers' ability to innovate and improve
efficiency.
This Article undertakes a deep look at the technology competence
requirement through the lens of transactional lawyering, and encourages
the ABA to provide more flexible and adaptable guidance to transactional
lawyers when navigating the technology competence standard. Particu-
larly, this Article suggests that the technology needs of clients should drive
the definition of what constitutes "relevant technology" under Comment
8, and requests that the ABA provide such guidance explicitly in a formal
ethics opinion. As Rule 1.1 clearly focuses on the "client" and "representa-
tion," guidance surrounding Comment 8 must do the same, and lawyers
should be required to become and remain competent in any technology
used by, or beneficial to, their clients.
The vignette of the airline pilots demonstrates that technological ad-
vances that reduce costs and increase efficiency typically open up services
to a broader and more diverse group of consumers. In fact, airlines ex-
pect the volume of commercial passengers to double over the next twenty
years. 16 Only with the use of the improved airline technologies discussed
above would such increases be remotely possible. An increase in the tech-
nological efficiency of lawyers, particularly transactional lawyers, could
similarly improve access to representation for additional clients, including
clients like non-profits,1 7 small businesses, and entrepreneurs. These cli-
ents tend to exhibit higher cost sensitivity and are therefore less likely to
engage counsel as vigorously as more developed businesses.18
Further, plenty of room exists for the legal industry to absorb the in-
creases in efficiency that an enhanced, appropriately-enforced technology
competence rule would foster. Specifically, a 2017 study on lawyer effi-
ciency by the legal technology company Clio found that the average lawyer
working eight hours a day produces only 2.3 hours of billable legal work."
The remaining six hours, the study found, were spent on administrative
tasks such as "[o]ffice administration, generating and sending bills, con-
figuring technology, and collections."20 The task of "configuring technol-
16. Garcia, supra note 5.
17. See Drew Simshaw, Ethical Issues in Robo-Lawyering: The Need for Guidance on
Developing and Using Artificial Intelligence in the Practice of Law, 70 HASTINGs L.J. 173,
176-77 (2018) (detailing how legal Al services like DoNotPay and Upsolve can
provide low or no cost legal services to clients facing relatively simple legal
problems).
18. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Wy Can't We Be Friends? A Business
Finance Lawyer's Plaintive Plea to Entrepreneurs, 95 N.C. L. REv. 1459, 1464-66 (2017).
19. CLJO, LEGAL TRENDs REPORT 10-11 (2017).
20. Id. at 11-13.
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ogy" accounted for 11% of that time.2 1 This equates to roughly 40
minutes per day, or 10,000 minutes per year, for the lawyer who works 50
weeks at 8 hours per day. Using even a portion of the 10,000 minutes a
lawyer spends struggling with technology could greatly increase the law-
yer's ability to generate additional billable work. This increase in produc-
tivity could help drive down billable costs, without sacrificing the lawyer's
bottom line.2 2 This enhanced efficiency carries with it the possibility of
opening up legal services to traditionally under-represented groups.2 3
While lawyers (and the legal industry more broadly) harbor signifi-
cant concern that increased technology, particularly the use of artificial
intelligence and automation, could instead strip them of the billable hours
required to run a successful practice,24 the vignette of the airline pilots
remains instructive. The pilots feared that fewer engineers meant fewer
jobs, but on the contrary, increases in efficiency led to the expansion of
the industry through an increased number of flights and passengers. De-
spite the fact that computers are used track those additional flight paths,
human pilots and air traffic controllers are still required for the higher-
level decision making related to weather and other unforeseen obstacles.
Similarly, transactional lawyers who can embrace technology, while
wielding their human intelligence and depth of experience in deal-mak-
ing, can potentially expand and enhance their practice. In fact, the skill of
complex contract preparation has been noted as a "uniquely human" un-
dertaking.25 Fears concerning the ability of automated tools to overtake
the role of the lawyer in contract preparation are therefore somewhat un-
founded. Client needs and client demands are at the forefront of any
industry. This is particularly true in an industry such as transactional lawy-
ering, where lawyers strive to effectuate clients' proposed transactions
through complex written documents. Advances in transactional legal
technology have the ability to reduce time spent on mechanical, repetitive
21. Id. at 13.
22. Note that in order to maintain similar income while billing fewer hours,
lawyers will need to consider adopting alternate billing strategies, such as flat rate,
fixed fee, or per transaction billing. The ABA has recognized that such arrange-
ments make legal "services more affordable, accessible, and transparent," particu-
larly to low and moderate income clients. See ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON
DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES, ALTERNATIVE FEE ARRANGEMENTS, https://www.ameri-
canbar.org/groups/delivery_1egal-services/initiatives_awards/alternative fees/
[https://perma.cc/V3Z7-G2EG] (last visited Mar. 6, 2020).
23. See Heminway, supra note 18, at 1466; Agnieszka McPeak, Disruptive Tech-
nology and the Ethical Lawyer, 50 U. TOL. L. REV. 457, 459 (2019) (noting that
"[o]verall, disruptive technology can be a good thing. Companies innovate and
find new and better products and services to offer, and consumers benefit from
lower costs, more choice, and access in under-served areas of the market.").
24. See Simshaw, supra note 17, at 192-94.
25. Kathryn D. Betts & Kyle R. Jaep, The Dawn ofFully Automated Contract Draft-
ing: Machine Learning Breathes New Life into a Decades-Old Promise, 15 DuKE L. &
TECH. REV. 216, 217 (2017).
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tasks,26 freeing up lawyer time for more nuanced work. As such, regulat-
ing technology competence by focusing on encouraging efficiency and in-
novation carries the potential to help lawyers provide enhanced client
service.
This Article will proceed in three parts. Part I will examine the impe-
tus behind the adoption of Comment 8 and consider the ABA's attitude
toward technology. Part I will conclude by discussing the steps taken by
the ABA and state regulators in early adopting states to enforce Comment
8. Part II of the Article will then examine which types of technologies
scholars have considered mandatory for lawyers seeking to attain technol-
ogy competence, and discuss the dearth of such guidance in the transac-
tional context. Part III will provide recommendations for ways in which
the ABA and state regulators could better align enforcement of Comment
8 with a structural, adaptable, and client-focused view of its applicability.
Part III will continue by discussing ways in which such a client-centric revi-
sion to Comment 8 would enhance transactional lawyers' ability to both
abide by the Comment, and provide efficient, effective representation to a
broader group of clientele, followed by a conclusion.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT AND ENFORCEMENT OF COMMENT 8
To RULE 1.1 OF THE MODEL RULES
In order to better understand why a client-focused interpretation of
Comment 8 would benefit transactional lawyers, it is important to under-
stand its development, the regulatory structure of the legal industry in the
various adopting jurisdictions, as well as the current state of technology
competence enforcement (both in jurisdictions that have adopted Com-
ment 8, and some that have not). Understanding these various ap-
proaches can provide insight into potential revisions and/or enforcement
schemes that could bring client interests to bear on Comment 8, providing
additional guidance for transactional lawyers.
A. The ABA Ethics 20/20 Commission and the History of Comment 8
The Model Rules, promulgated by the ABA provide the requirement
that lawyers maintain competence in Rule 1.1-the very first published
rule-indicating the duty's fundamental importance in legal practice.27
The competence duty set forth in Rule 1.1 requires that "[a] lawyer shall
provide competent representation to a client," which entails using "the
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary
for the representation."28 Existing comments to Rule 1.1 indicate that
competence is considered on a case-by-case basis, in a somewhat subjective
manner. Specifically, Comment 1 to Rule 1.1 indicates that competence is
26. Simshaw, supra note 17, at 192 (discussing time savings associated with
document review technology).
27. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (Am. BAR ASs'N 2018).
28. Id.
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keyed to the "nature of the matter" and "the lawyer's training and experi-
ence in the field."2 9
Nonetheless, remaining comments to Rule 1.1 swing to more objec-
tive considerations, detailing important legal skills such as issue identifica-
tion, which transcend the lawyer's background and level of experience.30
Measurements of competence are generally focused on lawyers' substan-
tive knowledge of the law, as well as their skills in representing clients for
particular matters.3 1 Commentary concerning the competence duty in re-
gard to transactional practice echoes this objective sentiment. Specifically,
it has been noted that transactional lawyers, like all other lawyers, "should
be careful in performing legal work."3 2
In a move away from this general guidance concerning the compe-
tence duty, Comment 8 was added to Rule 1.1 by the ABA in 2012, specifi-
cally addressing technology use.3 3 This comment evolved, in part, from
state-level regulators' recognition of the pitfalls associated with lawyers'
technology use. These regulators are tasked with enforcement of the
Model Rules in the jurisdictions where they have been adopted, and many
began issuing ethics opinions dealing with technology in the years leading
up to 2012.3' Thus, the ABA began to recognize "technology's growing
importance to the delivery of legal and law-related services."35
Therefore, Comment 8 requires that in order to maintain compe-
tence, lawyers should "keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice,
including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology, en-
gage in continuing study and education and comply with all continuing
legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject."3 6 To date,
thirty-eight states have adopted Comment 8 in some form.37 To under-
29. Id. at cmt. 1.
30. Id. at cmt. 2.
31. See Steven M. Puiszis, A Lawyer's Duty of Technological Competence, AM. BAR
Ass'N, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/professionalre
sponsibility/2017%2oMeetings/Conference/conference materials/session4_infor
mation-governance/puiszis_1awyers-duty-technological-competence.authcheck
dam.pdf [https://perma.cc/GM23-YPCZ] (last visited Aug. 2, 2019).
32. Michael L. Shakman et al., There but for the Grace of God Go I: A Look at the
Modern Transactional Legal Malpractice Case, 18 CBA REC. 32, 35 (2004).
33. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2018);
ABA COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20, REVISED 105A As AMENDED 3 (2012) [hereinafter
ABA COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20 REVISED 105A As AMENDED], https://www.ameri-
canbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20120808_revisedre
solution_105a_asamended.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9P9-3PZM].
34. See infra Section I.B.
35. Andrew Perlman, The Twenty-First Centuy Lawyer's Evolving Ethical Duty of
Competence, 22 PROF'L LAw. 24, 25 (2014).
36. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2018).
37. Bob Ambrogi, And Now Another State Adopts Duty of Tech Competence, Bring-
ing Total to 38, LAWSITES (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.lawsitesblog.com/2019/12/
and-now-another-state-adopts-duty-of-tech-competence-bringing-total-to-38.html
[https://perma.cc/58MX-DCZ2]. South Carolina, the most recent adopting state,
joined Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
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stand the applicability and enforcement of Comment 8 more deeply, a
review of the history surrounding its adoption by the ABA is required.
In 2009, the ABA convened the Commission on Ethics 20/20 (the
Commission) to tackle ethical and regulatory issues associated with the
evolution in technology and increase of globalization." The process for
recommending and adopting amendments to the Model Rules included a
comment period, open meetings, public hearings, and other methods for
obtaining feedback on the proposed resolutions from diverse segments of
the bench, bar, and academy. 9 The Commission ultimately produced fif-
teen resolutions resulting in amendments to several of Model Rules and
comments thereto (collectively, the 20/20 Amendments), which were
adopted by the ABA in 2012.40
We can trace the genesis of Comment 8 by looking first to discussion
from the various meetings convened prior to its adoption. The minutes of
the meeting on October 15, 2010 highlight that Commission members
had some concerns about the use of technology to meet client demands
more efficiently, in addition to discussing the evolution of legal practice
itself.41 Commenters specifically pointed out "new technologies are forc-
ing lawyers to collaborate more with clients and colleagues in the perform-
ance of their duties."42
Nonetheless, significantly more commentary pointed out concerns
surrounding confidentiality and data storage concerns surrounding tech-
nology. Commenters urged the Commission to "consider providing the
profession with greater guidance about how lawyers and law firms handle
client data."43 The focus on technology ineptitude as a risk to client confi-
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Texas Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyo-
ming. See Bob Ambrogi, Tech Competence, LAwSITES, https://www.lawsitesblog
.com/tech-competence [https://perma.cc/HHA5-5RQ5] (last visited Mar. 4,
2020) (this site, maintained by Robert Ambrogi, includes an interactive map of
adopting states). Note also that "California, while not having formally adopted the
change to its rules of professional conduct, has issued an ethics opinion that ex-
pressly acknowledges a duty of lawyers to be competent in technology." Id.; Cal.
State Bar Formal Op. 2015-193 (addressing issues associated with e-Discovery, and
quoting Comment 8).
38. See ABA COMM'N ON ETHICs 20/20, INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 1
(2012), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/eth-
ics_2020/20120508 ethics 20 20 final hod introdution andoverviewreport
.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3MZ-YRJN] [hereinafter ABA COMM'N ON ETHICs 20/20,
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW].
39. Id. at 2-3, 13.
40. See generally id.
41. ABA COMM'N ON ETHICs 20/20, Minutes of Meeting on October 15, at 7
(2010), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/eth-
ics_2020/20101510_minutes.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3R5-AEBD].
42. Id.
43. Id.
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dentiality is notable in these minutes and throughout the adoption pro-
cess of Comment 8. These concerns stand in contrast to the minority
voice, which urges a focus on enhanced collaboration and expanded use
of technology to improve efficiency.
Upon the adoption of the Amendments in 2012, the Commission
noted several concerns regarding technology in its Introduction and Over-
view to the Amendments (the Introduction). Specifically, the Commission
discussed lawyers' methods of conducting investigations, research, discov-
ery, and advising clients.4 However, based on the Introduction's cover-
age, the Commission retained as its primary concern maintaining
confidentiality in light of evolving technology for storing and transmitting
client information.4 5 These concerns around "data security" appear to
have retained their position of primary importance to the Commission,
echoing the voices of the commenters in the meeting minutes.4 6
In discussing the reasoning behind the proposed adoption of Com-
ment 8, the Commission noted in the Introduction that technology was
changing at a "bewildering pace."47 The Commission suggested that a
duty of technological competence was already implicitly encompassed in
Rule 1.1, but it had now decided to make "explicit" the duty to understand
the "benefits and risks" of relevant technology.48 Echoing the emphasis
on data storage throughout the Introduction, the notes on the proposed
Comment provided a particular emphasis on previous ethics opinions con-
cerning cloud computing.4 9 The Commission made clear that the duty to
maintain technology competence, while not new, was being made explicit
by the new Comment 8.50
As mentioned above, it is important to note that the final version of
Comment 8 included the word "relevant," limiting the requirement for
technology competence to only "relevant technology."51 The term was ad-
ded at some point after the February 21, 2012 draft5 2 and prior to the final
44. ABA COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20, INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW, supra note
38, at 4.
45. Id. at 4-5.
46. See id. (delivery of legal services and security/safety client communications
are mentioned in four out of seven of the paragraphs devoted to the discussion of
technology).
47. Id. at 8.
48. Id. (noting that while technology competence was implicitly required in
pre-existing Comment 6 to Rule 1.1, a new comment specifically addressing tech-
nology was required in order to make this requirement explicit).
49. See id.
50. Id.
51. ABA COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20, REVISED 105A As AMENDED, supra note 33,
at 3.
52. AM. BAR Ass'N COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20, REVISED DRAFT RESOLUTIONS FOR
COMMENT, TECHNOLOGY AND CONFIDENTIALITY (2012), https://www.americanbar
.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20O1221_ethics 20t20 re
vised draft resolutionand-reporttechnologyand confidentialitytpostingjfinal
.pdf [https://perma.cc/2URP-YAV3].
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adoption of the Comment 8 in August 2012. The meeting minutes and
the Introduction are silent as to why the term "relevant" was added, and
similarly silent as to the application of the term. It remains unclear if the
technology with regard to which a lawyer must maintain competence
should be relevant to the lawyer's practice, firm, industry, client, or some
other area. This lack of clarity impacts the enforcement of the rule and
precipitates some of the problems in directly applying Comment 8 in the
context of transactional lawyering, as will be discussed in Sections III.B
and III.C, infra.
The Commission also issued a final report on Comment 8 (the Re-
port), which provides additional information regarding the Commission's
goals and objectives in adopting a technology competence requirement.5 3
The Report, mirroring the meeting minutes and Introduction, places pri-
mary importance on developing "guidance for lawyers regarding their eth-
ical obligations to protect [clients' confidential] information when using
technology."54 However, the Report does address additional types of tech-
nology in creating a baseline for technology competence.
Specifically, the Report notes that in 2012's environment, "a lawyer
would have difficulty providing competent legal services .. . without know-
ing how to use email or create an electronic document."55 The conclu-
sion to the Report further notes that increased use of technology by
lawyers "can increase the quality of legal services, reduce the cost of legal
services to existing clients, and enable lawyers to represent clients who
might not otherwise have been able to afford those services." 56 The con-
clusion to the Report also reminds lawyers, once again, of the "risks to
clients' confidential information" associated with the increased use of
technology.5 7 Nonetheless, the overall tenor of the Report focuses on
Comment 8 as a means of encouraging an increase in technology use by
lawyers. Further, the Report provides a sense of an evolving baseline, due
to the note that email competence would be required in "today's
environment."5 8
Scholars who have studied the early impact of the resolutions promul-
gated by the Commission praise Comment 8 as one of the successes of the
Commission, particularly as juxtaposed with the Commission's work on
globalization. In reflecting on her work with the Commission, and the
outcome of its work, Laurel Terry notes that "the Commission was much
53. ABA COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20, REP. TO THE N.Y. H.D., RESOLUTION TO
AMEND THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, H.D. Doc. No. 105A, AT 1
(Aug. 2012), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
ethics_2020/2012 hodannual_meeting_105ajfiledtmay_2012.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/R6SQ-SMW3].
54. Id. at 1.
55. Id. at 3.
56. Id. at 6.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 3.
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more successful with the technology aspect of its work than it was with [its]
globalization aspect."5 9 Specifically, Terry points out that the technology
competence requirement was drafted as a "structural" change to the com-
petence requirement.6 0 As such, Comment 8 "created a framework to ad-
dress future issues." 6 1 Other scholars have described Comment 8 as
"purposefully broad" and capable of addressing "technologies that have
not yet been conceived."62
Further, in Terry's opinion, the framing of Comment 8 to encompass
"relevant" technologies creates an "adaptable" standard.6 3 This standard,
according to Terry, works better than the standards enacted by the Com-
mission with regard to globalization, because Comment 8 "requires law-
yers to keep abreast of technology changes without any additional action
required on the part of the ABA." 64 By avoiding discrete, overly-prescrip-
tive drafting in Comment 8, therefore, the ABA created a "gift that will
keep on giving." 65
Terry's conclusion that Comment 8 provides an evolving standard is
accurate and comports with the guidance gleaned from the Commission's
final Report on Comment 8.66 Terry's insights are also helpful in consid-
ering how Comment 8 applies to transactional lawyers in the face of cur-
rent enforcement measures, which focus primarily on data security.
However, state regulators enacting and enforcing the Comment, as well as
scholars who have discussed it, have instead provided narrow, prescriptive
guidance and enforcement. In doing so, these regulators have frustrated
the purpose of Comment 8, while also leaving transactional lawyers with
insufficient guidance on how to attain technological competence.
Specifically, transactional lawyers already face significant ambiguity
concerning the application of the Model Rules to their practice, as will be
discussed in Part III, infra. As such, prescriptive, litigation-focused gui-
dance is doubly unhelpful.
Therefore, this Article suggests a client-focused interpretation of
Comment 8, which goes beyond familiarity with clients' own technology,
to address issues of efficiency in transactional legal practice overall. Spe-
cifically, should Comment 8 be interpreted to align with client needs, effi-
ciency and outcomes can be improved. However, before exploring the
benefits of client-centered guidance, it is necessary to understand the cur-
59. Laurel S. Terry, Globalization and the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20: Reflec-
tions on Missed Opportunities and the Road Not Taken, 43 HOESTRA L. REv. 95, 95-96
(2014).
60. Id. at 105 (emphasis omitted).
61. Id.
62. Jamie J. Baker, Beyond the Information Age: The Duty of Technology Competence
in the Algorithmic Society, 69 S.C. L. REv. 557, 557 (2018).
63. Terry, supra note 59, at 107 (emphasis omitted).
64. Id. at 106.
65. See id.
66. See ABA COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20 REVISED 105 As AMENDED, supra note
33, at 3.
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rent landscape of enforcement surrounding Comment 8. Unfortunately,
current enforcement by the ABA and early adopting jurisdictions is overly
narrow, prescriptive, and litigation-focused.
B. AdoptingJurisdictions' Approaches to the Enforcement and
Applicability of Rule Comments
In order to provide guidance as to enhanced enforcement and inter-
pretation of Comment 8 to benefit transactional lawyers, we must first un-
derstand current enforcement models in jurisdictions that have adopted
it. The way states enforce the comments to the Model Rules overall im-
pacts the applicability of Comment 8 in each jurisdiction. As a result, vari-
ations in state enforcement of the Model Rules and comments influence
the ways in which each state will attempt to regulate lawyers' technology
competence, in both litigation and transactional practice.
Specifically, most states that have adopted the Model Rules indicate
that the comments provide "guidance for practicing in compliance with
the rules," or have used similar language.67 Most of those states have also
adopted additional language from the Scope of the Model Rules, which
indicates the comments do not "add obligations" to the Model Rules, and
"the text of each Rule is authoritative." 68 A handful of other states, how-
ever, are either silent as to the comments, specifically indicate that they
67. See, e.g., IND. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope 11 14, 21 (2019) (noting
that the "Comments are intended as guides to interpretation, but the text of each
Rule is authoritative").
68. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Pmbl. & Scope 11 14, 21 (AM. BAR
Ass'N 2018). For states that have adopted some form of the "guidance" language
in the Model Rules, see ALA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope 4 (2017); ARIZ.
CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope 11 14, 21 (2016); ARK. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
Scope 11 14, 21 (2019); COLo. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope 11 14, 21 (2018);
CONN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope (2019); DEL. LAWs'. RULES OF PROF'L CON-
DUCT Scope 11 14, 21 (2013); FIA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope (2019); IDAHO
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope 11 14, 21 (2014); ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
OF 2010 Scope 11 14, 21 (2016); IND. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope 11 14, 21
(2019); IOWA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope 11 14, 21 (2015); KAN. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT Scope 11 14, 21 (2019); Ky. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope 11
15, 22 (2019); MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope 11 1, 9 (2019); Mo. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope 11 14, 21 (2019); NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
Scope 11 14, 21 (2019); NEV. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.10A (2018); N.M.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope (2019); N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope
11 1, 8 (2019); N.D. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope 11 1, 5 (2019); OHIo RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope 11 14, 21 (2019); OKLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
Scope 11 14, 21 (2019); PA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope 11 14, 21 (2019);
S.C. Rules of Prof'1 Conduct Scope 1 1 (2019) TENN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
Scope 11 15, 23 (2019); TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope 1 10
(2019); UTAH RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope 11 14, 21 (2019); VA. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT Scope (2019); VT. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT ¶¶ 14, 21 (2019);
WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope 11 14, 21 (2019); W. VA. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT Scope 11 14, 21 (2018); Wyo. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT FOR ATT'YS AT
LAw Scope 11 14, 21 (2019).
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have not adopted the comments in any way, or specify that they have not
adopted the comments but publish them only for convenience.6 9
The fact that the various states enforce the comments inconsistently
raises the question as to why the ABA chose to include the technology
competence requirement in a comment. The Commission's work is silent
as to this decision. Perhaps the Commission's position that the require-
ment for technology competence was already inherent in Rule 1.170 led
them to decide that a comment was an appropriate vehicle for emphasiz-
ing and clarifying the requirement.7 1 These inconsistencies make it all
the more urgent to fully examine the enforcement of Comment 8, and
determine what additional guidance should be provided to lawyers on a
national level, to enhance clarity.
Adding to the confusion, several of the states that have adopted Com-
ment 8 have taken different positions on whether to adopt it verbatim, or
to edit, limit, or expand the language provided by the Commission.72 Of
the thirty-eight states that have adopted Comment 8, the majority adopted
the language provided by the Commission verbatim.7' The states that
have altered the Commission's language have primarily done so in order
to either strengthen or clarify its coverage. Interestingly, of the six states
that have adopted alternative versions of Comment 8,7 one is silent on
the enforceability of the comments,75 and another has published but not
69. Louisiana has not adopted the comments, and its rules are silent with
regard to them. See LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2018). Montana appears not
to have adopted the comments, but the preamble to its rules includes the "gui-
dance" language. MONT. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Pmbl. 1 15 (2016). Finally,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, and Wisconsin publish the comments, but
note that they are not endorsed or adopted. MINN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
(2018); N.H. Sup. Ct. Order (July 25, 2007) (repealing and replacing New Hamp-
shire Rules of Professional Conduct); N.H. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Statement
of Purpose (2018); N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2018); Wis. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT FOR ATT'YS Scope (2017).
70. See ABA COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20, INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW, suprT
note 38, at 8.
71. See id.
72. Baker, supra note 62, at 563-66.
73. Id. at 564; see also Ambrogi, supra note 37; ARK. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
r. 1.1 cmt. on Maintaining Competence (2019); IND. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r.
1.1 cmt. 6 (2019); Ky. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 6 (2019); LA. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (2018); Mo. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 6
(2019); MONT. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Pmbl. ¶ 5 (2016); TEX. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (2019); VT. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (2019).
74. The six states that have altered the Commission's language are Colorado,
Florida, Indiana, Montana, New York, and West Virginia. See COLo. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT 1.1 cmt. 8 (2018); FIA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 4-1.1, cmt. ¶
3 (2019); IND. RULES OF PRO'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 6 (2019); MONT. RULES OF
PRO'L CONDUCT r. 1.1, Pmbl. ¶ 5 (2016); N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt.
8 (2018); W. VA. RULES OF PRO'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (2019).
75. Louisiana is silent as to the effect of the comments. See LA. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT (2018).
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officially adopted the comments. 7 6 Thus, the overall enforceability of the
comments in these states is unclear, yet they provide some of the most
insightful and detailed adaptations of Comment 8.
Three of the six states that have made changes to Comment 8, New
York, Indiana, and Colorado, have revised the Comment's substantive obli-
gations. Specifically, New York's version of Comment 8 provides that the
lawyer must "keep abreast of the benefits and risks associated with technol-
ogy the lawyer uses to provide services to clients or to store or transmit confidential
information."77 Additionally, Indiana indicates that the lawyer must stay up
to speed with regard to "the benefits and risks associated with the technol-
ogy relevant to the lawyer's practice."7 8 Colorado requires competence in
both "changes in communications and other relevant technologies."7 9
The three other states that have altered the language of Comment 8,
Montana, West Virginia, and Florida, made changes to the strength and
enforceability of the Comment, rather than the substance. Montana indi-
cates that Rule 1.1 itself implies an obligation to abide by the technology
competence comment,8 0 and West Virginia indicates that lawyers "must"
(rather than "should") stay abreast of changes in technology.81 Finally,
Florida notes that maintaining technology competence may require "re-
tention of a non-lawyer advisor with established technological competence
in the relevant field."8 2 Among other states, Florida also requires a
mandatory continuing legal education on technology use.8 3
These outliers in their adoption of Comment 8 provide considerable
insight into the potential problems associated with the framing of the
Comment by the Commission. While the broad phrasing provides the
benefits of evolution with emerging technology, and the "structural" char-
acteristics noted by Terry84 limit the need for future amendments to Com-
ment 8, the lack of guidance provided by the Commission is reflected in
76. Montana references the comments in the Preamble to the Rules, but has
not officially adopted them. MONT. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Pmbl. 1 15 (2016).
The New York State Bar Association issued the Preamble, Scope, and Comments,
but they were not enacted along with the Rules. See N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L CON-
DUCT (2018).
77. N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (2018) (emphasis added).
78. IND. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 6 (2019) (emphasis added).
79. COLo. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (2018) (emphasis added).
80. MONT. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 Pmbl. ¶ 5 (2016).
81. W. VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (2019).
82. FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 4-1.1 cmt. ¶ 3 (2019) ("Competent rep-
resentation may also involve the association or retention of a non-lawyer advisor of
established technological competence in the field in question.").
83. THE FLORIDA BAR, Frequently Asked Questions About CLE Requirements, https:/
/www.floridabar.org/member/cle/cler-faq/ [https://perma.cc/QBQ3-E5CQ]
(last visited Nov. 3, 2019) (noting that " [o]ver a 3-year period, each member must
complete 33 hours, 5 of which must be in the area of ethics, professionalism, sub-
stance abuse, mental illness awareness, or bias elimination and 3 hours of
technology").
84. Terry, supra note 59, at 95.
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the changes made by these six states. In particular, the focus by New York
and Indiana on the lawyer's clients and practice is particularly telling.
This change suggests that the use of the term "relevant" in the Commis-
sion's version might lack sufficient clarity, leading states to adopt a more
workable guideline. The changes to Comment 8 in New York and Indiana
provide a clearer alternative to the term "relevant"-keying the scope of
technological competence to practical and client-focused considerations.
Further, the strengthening of the enforcement of Comment 8 in Flor-
ida, Montana, and West Virginia suggest that some states disagree with the
placement of the requirement in a potentially unenforceable comment.
Further, the edits made in these states reveal that the Commission's belief
that the technology requirement was already "inherent"85 in the text of
the Rule 1.1 might not be shared by enforcing jurisdictions. Thus, an au-
thoritative statement concerning the enforceability of Comment 8 pro-
vided in an ABA formal ethics opinion might be a more appropriate
method of providing lawyers (particularly transactional lawyers) with gui-
dance regarding Comment 8's scope and enforcement.
The differences in phrasing, interpretation, and enforcement across
jurisdictions provides an opportunity for the ABA to reinforce its intent in
passing Comment 8, and provide consistent, broadly applicable guidelines
for enforcement. The approaches taken to clarify and enforce Comment
8 in several of the adopting states provide helpful starting points for con-
sidering how the ABA might frame any additional guidance. This Article
will continue by exploring the ABA and other adopting jurisdictions' en-
forcement to date.
C. Ethical Guidance and Specific Decisions Concerning Technology Competence
The ABA has issued only one formal opinion specifically mentioning
technology competence since the passage of Comment 8 in 2017.86 Issued
in 2017, ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 477 focuses on the security of client
information when transmitted electronically.8 7 Specifically, the opinion
looks at the language of Comment 8 in conjunction with the requirements
of Rule 1.6.88 Based on this review of the updated requirements under
the Comment and Rule 1.1, the ABA opines that to safeguard client infor-
mation being transmitted by email, "lawyers must exercise reasonable ef-
85. ABA COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20, INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW, supra note
38, at 8.
86. ABA COMM'N ON ETHICS & PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, FORMAL Op. 477
(2017). Note that two opinions focusing on social media by lawyers and judges
have been issued since the passage of Comment 8, but neither are relevant to
competence in technology use, rather its misuse. See ABA COMM'N OF ETHICS &
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, FORMAL Op. 466 (2014); ABA COMM'N OF ETHICS & PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY, FORMAL Op. 462 (2013).
87. See ABA COMM'N ON ETHICS & PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, FORMAL Op. 477
(2017).
88. Id.
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forts."89 However, according to the ABA, "[w]hat constitutes reasonable
efforts is not susceptible to a hard and fast rule, but rather is contingent
upon a set of factors."9 0 The opinion proceeds to provide a set of flexible,
objectively measured factors for lawyers to use in determining the level of
protection and types of technology required to be used in safeguarding
client information transmitted electronically.9 1
This opinion is important and telling for two reasons. First, it tele-
graphs the ABA's position that one of the main areas of focus in connec-
tion with the enforcement of Comment 8 rests on the issue of client data
security, a position that has been echoed by state and local regulators, as
discussed below. Secondly, the opinion suggests that the use of flexible
factors constitutes a helpful mechanism for determining whether lawyers'
behavior rises to the level of technologically competent. These insights
are helpful as a lens through which to view the enforcement of Comment
8 by state and local regulators. They also assist in considering ways in
which the ABA could provide guidance to transactional lawyers regarding
technological competence.
State regulators have issued a significantly deeper body of decisions
and guidance concerning technology competence than the ABA. Despite
their numbers, the focus of many of these opinions echoes ABA Formal
Opinion 477's concern for the security of client information. Scholars
have noted that state ethics regulators have "applied the [technology com-
petence] duty mainly to electronic discovery, electronic storage of infor-
mation, social media, and the cloud."9 2 In reviewing state ethics opinions
concerning technology competence, it becomes clear that a majority of
the guidance issued before and after the ABA's enactment of Comment 8
has dealt primarily with electronic storage of law firm and client data. Spe-
cifically, twenty-one states have issued ethics opinions permitting the use
of cloud storage for law firm data, with several of these states issuing multi-
ple opinions on the issue.93 This number includes five states that have yet
to adopt Comment 8.9
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See id.
92. Baker, supra note 62, at 557-58.
93. Ala. Ethics Op. 2010-02 (2010); Ariz. State Bar Formal Op. 05-04 (2005);
Ariz. State Bar Formal Op. 09-04 (2009); Cal. State Bar Formal Op. 2010-179
(2010); Conn. Informal Op. 2013-07 (2013); Fla. Bar Op. 12-3 (2013); Ill. Adv. Op.
16-06 (2016); Iowa Ethics Op. 11-01 (2011); Me. Ethics Op. 207 (2013); Mass. Eth-
ics Op. 12-03 (2012); Nev. Ethics Op. 33 (2006); N.H. Ethics Op. 2012 13/4
(2012); N.J. Adv. Comm'n on Prof' Ethics Op. 701 (2006); N.Y. Ethics Op. 842
(2010); N.Y. Ethics Op. 1020 (2014); N.C. 2011 Formal Ethics Op. 6 (2011); Ohio
Informal Ethics Op. 2013-03 (2013); Or. Ethics Op. 2011-188 (Revised 2015); Pa.
Ethics Op. 2011-200 (2011); Tenn. Ethics Op. 2015-F-159 (2015); Vt. Ethics Op.
2010-6 (2010); Va. Ethics Op. 1872 (2013); Wash. Adv. Op. 2215 (2012).
94. See id. Specifically, Alabama, California, Maine, Nevada, and Oregon.
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The issue of cloud9 5 or other internet or electronic storage of data is
disproportionately covered in ethics opinions, as compared to any other
type of technology. Specifically, since the ABA's passage of Comment 8 in
2012, thirteen opinions concerning cloud storage of data have been is-
sued.9 6 In that same timeframe less than half as many opinions have been
issued covering other types of technology.9 7 Those additional ethics opin-
ions discuss issues such as use of email tracking, metadata, social media,
and virtual law offices.9 8 Further, only New York has issued an opinion
regarding technology competence with a specific reference to transac-
tional practice.99 This opinion permits the use of cloud access to transac-
tional documents, subject to confidentiality requirements.1 00
With regard to cloud storage in general, every state ethics opinion
addressing the issue has permitted the use of cloud (also referred to as
"software as a service") storage for law firm data, often subject to certain
limitations. The most common limitation on cloud storage is the require-
ment that a lawyer assure oneself that the data stored on the cloud will be
safeguarded, in order to protect against violations of the lawyer's confiden-
tiality requirements.10 1 These opinions indicate that the lawyer can typi-
95. Tenn. Formal Ethics Op. 2015-F-159 (2015) ("Cloud computing is tech-
nology which allows a lawyer to store and access software or data through the
cloud-a remote location which is not controlled by the lawyer but by a third party
which provides the storage or other computing services. It is the use of a network
of remote servers, hardware and/or software to store, manage, transmit, process
and/or retrieve data off the lawyer's premises, rather than on a server or personal
computer on the lawyer's premises.").
96. Conn. Informal Op. 2013-07 (2013); Fla. Bar Op. 12-3 (2013); Ill. Adv.
Op. 16-06 (2016); Me. Ethics Op. 207 (2013); Mass. Ethics Op. 12-03 (2012); N.H.
Ethics Op. 2012 13/4 (2012); N.Y. Ethics Op. 1020 (2014); Ohio Ethics Op. 1020
(2014); Or. Ethics Op. 2011-188 (revised 2015); Tenn. Ethics Op. 2015-F-159
(2015); Va. Ethics Op. 1872 (2013); Wash. Adv. Op. 2215 (2012).
97. See Cal. Ethics Op. 2012-184 (2012) (virtual law office); Colo. Formal Eth-
ics Op. 127 (2015) (social media); N.Y. Ethics Op. 1020 (2014) (transactional
data); Ohio Ethics Op. 2017-05 (2017) (virtual law office); Va. Ethics Op. 1872
(2013) (virtual law office). Note that several of these opinions addressed both
cloud computing and other technologies.
98. Id.
99. N.Y. Ethics Op. 1020 (2014) (opining that " [w]hether a lawyer for a party
in a transaction may post and share documents using a 'cloud' data storage tool
depends on whether the particular technology employed provides reasonable pro-
tection to confidential client information").
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., Ariz. State Bar Formal Op. 05-04 (2005) (in order to use cloud
storage, "an attorney must be competent to evaluate the nature of the potential
threat to client electronic files and to evaluate and deploy appropriate computer
hardware and software to accomplish that end. An attorney who lacks or cannot
reasonably obtain that competence is ethically required to retain an expert con-
sultant who does have such competence."); Conn. Informal Op. 2013-07 (2013)
("In order to determine whether use of a particular technology or hiring a certain
particular service provider is consistent or compliant with the lawyer's professional
obligations, a lawyer must engage in due diligence."); Fla. Bar Op. 12-3 (2013)
("[L]awyers may use cloud computing if they take reasonable precautions to en-
sure that confidentiality of client information is maintained, that the service pro-
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cally attain this assurance through due diligence into the terms of the
cloud service provider, or by consulting with an expert on cloud
technology.
While states granting permission for lawyers to use cloud data storage
provides a safe harbor for lawyers with regard to one particular type of
technology, these opinions tend to stop short of providing any clear,
broadly applicable guidelines which a lawyer might use as a measuring
stick to independently evaluate additional types of technology, or the law-
yer's existing tech practices. Rather, the opinions put much of the risk
associated with technology use on the lawyer. For example, the Tennessee
opinion on cloud storage notes that " [d]ue to rapidly changing technol-
ogy, the Board doesn't attempt to establish a standard of care."10 2 Fur-
ther, one of the New York opinions notes that due to "the fact-specific and
evolving nature of technology, we do not purport to specify in detail the
steps that will constitute reasonable care in any given set of
circumstances."10 3
However, some of the opinions do provide helpful guidance, which
could potentially be considered by the ABA or other state ethics enforcers
in determining ways to provide lawyers, particularly transactional lawyers,
with more specific guidance on how to analyze their technology compe-
tence. Specifically, states such as California and Washington provide "fac-
tors" for lawyers to use in considering whether technology use meets
ethical requirements (whether imposed by Comment 8 or otherwise).104
Despite not having adopted Comment 8, the factors provided in the
California ethics opinion create a potentially helpful framework for analyz-
ing additional technologies beyond cloud storage software. The factors
provided by the California Bar, despite focusing on cloud software, can
potentially be adapted to additional types of technology. The factors
include:
(a) The attorney's ability to assess the level of security afforded by
the technology . . . . (b) Legal ramifications to third parties of
intercepting, accessing or exceeding authorized use of another
person's electronic information. . . . (c) The degree of sensitivity
of the information. . . . (d) Possible impact on the client of an
inadvertent disclosure of privileged or confidential information
or work product, including possible waiver of the privileges. ...
(e) The urgency of the situation.... [and] (f) Client instructions
and circumstances.10 5
vider maintains adequate security, and that the lawyer has adequate access to the
information stored remotely. The lawyer should research the service provider to
be used.").
102. Tenn. Ethics Op. 2015-F-159 (2015).
103. N.Y. Ethics Op. 1020 (2014).
104. Cal. State Bar Formal Op. 2010-179 (2010); Wash. Adv. Op. 2215 (2012).
105. Cal. State Bar Formal Op. 2010-179, at 3-6 (2010).
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While these factors are instructive, they remain limited to the use of
one type of technology. As such, this opinion, and others similarly focused
on cloud computing, fail to provide a valid framework for transactional
lawyers to assess developing technology as it becomes available. Further,
none of these opinions discuss the types of technology lawyers use to cre-
ate documents or work product. Rather, the analysis remains focused pri-
marily on the storage and communication of such work.
As such, the major problem surrounding the enforcement and gui-
dance provided thus far by both state bar associations and the ABA hear-
kens back to Laurel Terry's identification of Comment 8 as a "structural"
one.106 If Comment 8 was constructed to evolve along with the evolution
of technology without need for any amendment by the ABA, as Terry as-
serts,107 then guidance focused specifically on existing technologies misses
the mark. Guidance must be provided in a similarly structural manner in
order to prove effective and lasting. To determine a standard for enforce-
ment for Comment 8, we must first look to current guidance from active
scholars and transactional lawyers about technology competence in
practice.
This study will reveal that, much like state regulators, many scholars
focus on particular types of technology that must be mastered in order to
obtain technology competence. This narrow focus fails to provide lawyers
or regulators with the type of flexible, structural guidance necessary for
Comment 8 to reach its potential in encouraging innovation and enhanc-
ing efficiency of lawyers. Nonetheless, an understanding of current gui-
dance on best practices in both litigation and transactional practice can
assist in identifying broader best practices, and from there, we can begin
to formulate (and suggest that the ABA provide) helpful, structural gui-
dance for regulators and transactional lawyers with regard to Comment 8.
II. CURRENT LEGAL TECHNOLOGY: PRACTICES, GUIDANCE,
AND CHALLENGES
Much has been written regarding the impact technology competence
requirements will have on litigation practice. The bulk of this scholarship
discusses particular technologies, and focuses on the same main concerns
as those raised by the ABA and state legislators in their enforcement ac-
tions: data storage and security. However, certain scholars and commenta-
tors have provided more detailed guidance on the types of technologies
lawyers should (or must) familiarize themselves with in order to maintain
competence. In order to better guide transactional lawyers looking to at-
tain technology competence, we must first discuss the types of technolo-
gies that commentators have suggested are necessary to attain competence
in litigation practice, then address the unique position of transactional
practice within the regulatory structure of the Model Rules, and finally
106. See Terry, supra note 59, at 105.
107. Id. at 105-06.
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assess current concerns with the use of technology in transactional
practice.
A. Technology in Litigation Practice
In the years immediately following the passage of Comment 8 by the
ABA, and as it began to gain traction among the states, much of the schol-
arship discussing Comment 8 tracked the ground covered in the various
ethics opinions discussed above. Scholars have focused much of their cov-
erage on data security, communication, and cloud storage risks. 108 How-
ever, an emerging body of scholarship has begun to discuss additional
types of technology lawyers should master in order to attain technology
competence.10 9 This body of scholarship, however, is almost exclusively
focused on specific, litigation-oriented technologies such as e-Discov-
ery, 110 electronic filing,111 voir dire,11 2 and the use of artificial intelli-
gence to predict litigation outcomes and craft more effective litigation
documents.11 3
Further, certain litigators have even suggested that only five realms of
technological competence exist, each of which is keyed to technologies
used primarily in litigation practice.1 14 Those realms have been identified
as data security, electronic discovery, social media discovery, technology
used by clients in their businesses, and technology used to present media
in the courtroom.1 15 Other scholars of legal technology have added in-
sights concerning more broadly applicable technologies, such as social
media,11 6 blockchain,1 17 and artificial intelligence.1 18 A small minority of
articles, including Drew Simshaw's piece on artificial intelligence, have
suggested the necessity for additional, structural guidance by the ABA for
108. See, e.g., Peyton, supra note 7, at 8 (identifying common risks associated
with a lack of technology competence, and centering the list of common risks
around data theft risks).
109. See, e.g., infra notes 110-113 and 116-119, along with accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., Stacey Blaustein, Melinda L. McLellan, & James A. Sherer, Digi-
tal Direction for the Analog Attorney-Data Protection, E-Discovery, and the Ethics of Tech-
nological Competence in Today's World of Tomorrow, 22 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10 (2016).
111. See, e.g., Peyton, supra note 7, at 8.
112. See, e.g., Katy (Yin Yee) Ho, Defining the Contours of an Ethical Duty of Tech-
nology Competence, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 853, 859 (2017).
113. See, e.g., McPeak, supra note 23, at 463-64.
114. Puiszis, supra note 31, at 2.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Agniezszka McPeak, Social Media Snooping and Its Ethical Bounds,
46 ARIz. ST. L.J. 846 (2014).
117. Marco Dell'Erba, Demystifying Technology. Do Smart Contracts Require a New
Legal Framework? Regulatory Fragmentation, Self-Regulation, Public Regulation, U. PENN.
J.L. & PUB. AFF. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=3228445 [https://perma.cc/4ZQW-GMRR].
118. See, e.g., Simshaw, supra note 17; McPeak, supra note 23.
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lawyers grappling with evolving technology, but this approach remains the
minority.11 9
Nonetheless, most of the scholarship discussed above focuses on the
requirement that lawyers obtain and maintain competence in certain sug-
gested, narrow types of technology. This narrow, prescriptive approach to
attaining competence does little to assist transactional lawyers seeking to
assess their own competence, as very few of these articles have addressed
technology related to transactional practice. Further, ever fewer of these
articles have suggested the need for additional guidance from the ABA or
state regulators in the application of Comment 8 in various lawyering con-
texts. Both of these concerns need to be addressed in order to better
equip transactional lawyers with the tools necessary to both understand
and achieve the requirements of Comment 8 with regard to their evolving
area of practice.
The next section continues by discussing the unique position of trans-
actional lawyering under the Model Rules' litigation-oriented framework,
outlining some emerging technologies aimed at transactional practice,
highlighting how these technologies can assist transactional lawyers in pro-
viding more robust and effective client service, and concludes by identify-
ing client-focused guidelines as a more effective means of defining and
applying the technology competence requirement under Comment 8.
B. The Unique Position of Transactional Law
One concern around providing guidance to transactional lawyers with
regard to a technology competence requirement housed in the Model
Rules rests on the fact that they are notoriously litigation oriented. The
two main predecessors to the current Model Rules, the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics1 2 0 and the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, 121
each concentrate primarily on problems associated with litigation.1 22
Scholars of ethics have noted that the Canons of Professional Ethics, pub-
lished in 1908, "dealt almost exclusively with" litigation issues.123 Further,
scholars active at the time of the drafting of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility noted that the concerns of litigators were much more directly
regulated than the typical activities of the transactional lawyer.124
119. See, e.g., Simshaw, supra note 17, at 208.
120. ABA CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS (AM. BAR Ass'N 1908).
121. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT (AM. BAR Ass'N 1969).
122. Lori D. Johnson, The Ethics of Non-Traditional Contract Drafting, 85 U. CIN.
L. REv. 595, 597 (2016).
123. Louis M. Brown & Harold A. Brown, hat Counsel the Counselor? The Code
of Professional Responsibility's Ethical Considerations-A Preventive Law Analysis, 10 VAL.
U. L. REv. 453, 455 (1976) (explaining that although the original Cannons of Pro-
fessional Ethics dealt solely with litigation, it is no longer appropriate and the his-
torical bias towards litigation practice should be remedied).
124. Id.
Johnson: Navigating Technology Competence In Transactional Practice
20201 NAVIGATING TECHNOLOGY COMPETENCE 181
This litigation focus bled into the current Model Rules, as evidenced
by the fact that "with limited exceptions" there are no Model Rules directly
on point concerning professional behavior by transactional lawyers.125
The competence rule is notably broader in application than many ancil-
lary rules. Nonetheless, the comments to Rule 1.1 must be analogized and
applied to transactional work in a more tangential manner than required
in litigation practice. Further, many of the litigation technologies dis-
cussed thus far in existing scholarship deal with court filings and
processes.126 This scholarship has perhaps provided litigators with handy
benchmarks for assessing their technology competence, but leaves transac-
tional lawyers struggling to analogize technology useful in deal-making to
litigation tools.
Specifically, if a court has imposed a requirement for the use of tech-
nology, failure to use same would clearly fall below a competence duty for
a litigator. However, because transactional lawyers practice in an extra-
judicial context, outside of "the watching" function of the courts,12 7 it is
unlikely that requirements to adopt or use new technologies will be en-
forced by courts or any other outside source. This lack of clarity leaves
transactional lawyers vulnerable to potential unforeseen enforcement of
Rule 1.1.
However, early scholarship of transactional legal ethics may have pro-
vided some helpful guidance to transactional lawyers seeking to achieve
technology competence. These scholars have noted that the transactional
lawyer's "aspirations of competence" should include attaining "the knowl-
edge and skill to grasp the client's goals, to reframe them if necessary, to
initiate the discussion of alternative courses of conduct and, along with the
client, to be creative regarding the uses of the law." 12 8 This early framing
of the competence duty in the transactional context implicitly requires
that the transactional lawyer use the law in the way most beneficial to
achieving such client goals.
This client-focused approach to competence can and should extend
to the application of Comment 8. A client-centered approach can poten-
tially provide a much more appropriate framework for transactional law-
yers to assess their technology competence, as opposed to a framework
based on assessing court requirements and analogizing the types of tech-
nologies required in litigation practice into a transactional context. None-
theless, in order to better understand how such a client-oriented
framework might improve applicability of Comment 8 in transactional
125. STARK, supra note 15, at 455. Specifically, note that an entire Article of
the Model Rules is dedicated to the role of the lawyer as "Advocate" with no corol-
lary section devoted to the lawyer as dealmaker. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CON-
DUCT r. 3.1-3.7 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2018).
126. See infra Section III.A.
127. Paula Schafer, Harming Business Clients with Zealous Advocacy: Rethinking
the Attorney Advisor's Touchstone, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 251, 262 (2011).
128. Brown & Brown, supra note 123, at 476.
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practice, it will be helpful to identify technology concerns posited by trans-
actional lawyers in the current practice environment.
C. Technology in Transactional Practice
Another issue unique to transactional lawyers, with regard to adop-
tion and enforcement of Comment 8, is the prevailing wisdom that
"[t]ransactional lawyers have been notoriously slow to integrate technol-
ogy into their practices."1 29 As Wasim Quadir, a transactional lawyer who
recently left a BigLaw transactional practice to found a legal technology
company, recently noted:
I think the last big [technological] improvement [for transac-
tional lawyers] was the transition from typewriters to MS Word,
and then the technology stack that lawyers have been using, it's
been largely stagnant since. I mean the way we draft agreements
[has] pretty much been the same for many, many years. It starts
with finding the right sample document, precedent to start from,
[and] invariably that's not going to match the parameters of the
deal that's in front of you. 13 0
This resistance of transactional lawyers to integrate technology exists
despite "about a $1 billion inflow" into legal tech startups in recent
years.13 1 Judging by the list of exhibitors at the recent Legaltech
tradeshow, many new tools are becoming available to transactional law-
yers, particularly in connection with contract preparation.13 2
Nonetheless, in interviewing several lawyers for this Article, these law-
yers remain frustrated with both the availability of technology applicable
to their practice, and the functionality of tools their firms have adopted to
date. These frustrations center primarily around the inability of available
legal technology to adapt to the nuances of transactional practice, and the
demands of transactional clients.
Of course, when interviewing lawyers with regard to their use of tech-
nology in transactional practice, the problems identified varied from firm
to firm and lawyer to lawyer. However, in several interviews with lawyers
practicing at small, mid-sized, and large law firms, several patterns
129. Betts &Jaep, supra note 25, at 216 (citing Kingsley Martin, Emerging Con-
tract Technology: Automating the Contract Life-Cycle, LEGAL EXEC. INST. (Apr. 29,
2015)).
130. The Future of Transactional Law Practice, LEGAL TALK NETWORK PODCAST
(May 29, 2019), https://egaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/legal-toolkit/2019/05/
the-future-of-transactional-law-practice/ [https://perma.cc/U9R9-4QX4].
131. Id.
132. See 2020 Legaltech Exhibitors, LEGALWEEK, https://www.event.law.com/
legalweek/legaltech-exhibitors [https://perma.cc/L7MP-FVYF] (last visited Mar.
6, 2020). Specifically, exhibitors included ContractPodAl (offering a contract
automation product), eBrevia (offering an Al based contract data and analysis
tool), and Kira Systems (offering automated contract analysis).
Johnson: Navigating Technology Competence In Transactional Practice
20201 NAVIGATING TECHNOLOGY COMPETENCE 183
emerged.1 33 Across the solo practitioner, mid-sized firm lawyer, and
BigLaw partner interviewed, all of them still rely heavily on existing docu-
ment forms in creating transactional documents. This pattern fits with
Quadir's observations, discussed above. It is worth noting that none of the
lawyers interviewed use or have experimented with more advanced con-
tract creation or form-filling software or apps, such as those on exhibit at
the Legaltech tradeshow.13 4 The reasoning behind the decision varied
from lawyer to lawyer, but focused on the lawyer's comfort level with ex-
isting forms, and the client's reluctance to "reinvent the wheel" when cre-
ating transactional documents.
One potential explanation for this reluctance was voiced by the a
BigLaw partner, who noted in his interview that certain types of document
creation software available to transactional lawyers have been created by
specific interest and industry groups. This has made lawyers wary about
whether using such technology would benefit their clients, depending on
their role in the transaction, and the industry their client is engaged in.
Further, a mid-sized, regional firm lawyer noted that technology avail-
able from government agencies which lawyers use for transactional due
diligence lacks sophistication.1 35 This lawyer also noted that document
management software in use at the lawyer's firm, while incorporating
many specific sub-labels for litigation documents, had few options for spec-
ifying various types of transactional documents. This frustration provides
a real world example of the problems with the litigation focus of most
available legal technology tools and requirements.
Finally, a solo practitioner noted that law practice management
software is woefully unresponsive to the billing practices and other specific
needs of a transactional lawyer. Specifically, she noted that the software
was not easily adaptable to alternative billing structures her clients some-
times request. This concern reflects the ABA's suggestions associated with
billing, as the ABA Standing Commission on Delivery of Legal Services has
133. Interviews with various transactional lawyers on file with the author, avail-
able upon request. Please note that these interviews in no way constitute a repre-
sentative sample, but are rather intended as anecdotal examples of lawyer
concerns across several different types of practice environment. Empirical re-
search into technology use by and technology concerns of transactional lawyers
would be helpful in developing a deeper body of scholarship on this subject, and
the author is considering future projects of this nature.
134. These findings mirror formal empirical research into drafting of merger
and acquisition agreements, where it was found that transactional lawyers "appear
to use precedents that they are familiar with," many of which are available to attor-
neys through "data banks of model forms" available on law firms' "internal docu-
ment management system[s]." Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, Engineering
Greater Efficiency in Mergers & Acquisitions, 72 Bus. LAW. 657, 661 (2017).
135. Specifically, the lawyer noted that state and local websites for searching
recorded real estate documents and corporate organization documents were very
difficult to navigate and unsophisticated.
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noted that fixed fee and other alternative billing structures often help fee
sensitive, small firm clients.1 3 6
Despite the differences in firm size and client sophistication, and the
different technologies being discussed, the concerns expressed by these
lawyers all seem to coalesce around the same basic topics-efficiency in
practice management and enhanced client service. These concerns mir-
ror those reflected in the commentary of legal technology scholars and
experts.1 37
While Comment 8 itself appears silent to these concerns, both New
York and Indiana, in adopting more nuanced versions of the Comment,
appear to have appreciated these problems, and responded by tying their
concepts of "relevance" under Comment 8 to the clients, and the lawyer's
practice, respectively.138
Therefore, the ABA should consider studying the approaches pro-
vided by these states, as well as the flexible factors provided in California's
relevant ethics opinion, to craft additional guidance for transactional law-
yers seeking to abide by their technology competence duties. A more cli-
ent-focused approach to technology competence could both provide more
helpful guidance to lawyers, as well as potentially advance development
and adoption of the legal technology tools transactional lawyers are seek-
ing, such as advanced law practice management technology and document
preparation tools.
Further, focusing (as previous scholars of this topic have done) on
specific, limited types of technology provides an insufficient framework for
lawyers, particularly transactional ones to appropriately gauge their level
of technology competence. While several types of technologies litigators
have suggested must be mastered for a lawyer to achieve technological
competence in their field have easily identifiable transactional corol-
laries,13 9 this type of regulation by analogy remains rooted in the outdated
136. See ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES, ALTERNA-
TIVE FEE ARRANGEMENTS, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/delivery_1egal-ser-
vices/initiatives awards/alternativefees/ [https://perma.cc/4NYK-8TTS].
137. See generally Betts & Jaep, supra note 25.
138. See supra notes 77-78.
139. Several types of technology applicable to transactional lawyering are
comparable to the types of technology discussed by scholars of litigation technol-
ogy as requisite to technology competence litigation practice. For example, e-sig-
nature technology can be compared to electronic filing technology, as it assists
transactional lawyers in facilitating deal closings. See Andreas Rivera, Electronic Sig-
natures and the Law: Wat You Need to Know, BUSINESS.COM (Dec. 21, 2017), https://
www.business.com/articles/electronic-signatures-and-the-law-what-you-need-to-
know/ [https://perma.cc/9EA2-PNUT]. Further, new technology such as
LawGeex Al tools, eBrevia's "diligence accelerator," and Kira Systems's due dili-
gence engine (among others) can assist transactional lawyers in due diligence re-
view of contracts, which is similar to e-Discovery technology used by litigators. See
Comparing the Performance of Artificial Intelligence to Human Lawyers in the Review of
Standard Business Contracts, LAWGEEX (2018), https://images.law.com/contrib/
content/uploads/documents/397/5408/awgeex.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5D4-
99N3]; Diligence Accelerator, EBREvIA, https://ebrevia.com/diligence-accelerator
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conceptions of the Model Rules as being keyed primarily to the concerns
of the litigator. Additionally, focusing enforcement and guidance around
specific types of technology further erodes the "structural," anti-prescrip-
tivist approach to technology competence originally envisioned by the
Commission, and championed by Laurel Terry. 140
The best approach to making the requirements of Comment 8 clearer
for transactional lawyers, while at the same time permitting them to serve
as a springboard for innovation, lies in looking to some of the creative
approaches taken by enforcing states. The flexible guidelines proposed by
states such as California and Washington, as well as the substantive edits
provided by New York and Indiana can help guide the ABA in developing
appropriate national level guidelines for the enforcement and interpreta-
tion of Comment 8. The final Part of this Article will explore potential
solutions for enforcement provided by states to date, and suggest a more
workable alternative of providing guidance to transactional lawyers on the
enforcement of Comment 8 through flexible factors dispensed by the ABA
in a formal ethics opinion.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
There exist several potential avenues pursuant to which the ABA and
state regulators could provide additional clarity and guidance for transac-
tional lawyers in abiding by their technology competence requirements.
Two such avenues, additional CLE requirements and edits to Comment 8,
are discussed below. However, neither of these options provides a silver
bullet to ensure that technology competence is attained and retained by
transactional lawyers.14 1 Reviewing these two options, however, helps clar-
ify that there is a need for formal guidance by the ABA into how technol-
ogy competence should be measured, and that providing client-focused
guidelines can assist lawyers-particularly transactional lawyers-in attain-
ing technology competence.
[https://perma.cc/4ZBJ-66A2]; McPeak, supra note 23, at 462; Betts &Jaep, supra
note 25, at 225. Finally, programs like Contract Catch, LexPredict, and Bloom-
berg's Corporate Transactions, which use algorithms to review and provide in-
sights into contract provisions, can be compared to technology like Ross
Intelligence, Westlaw Edge, Casetext, and Compose, which leverage Al in the liti-
gation context. See CONTRACT CATCH, https://contractcatch.com/ [https://perma
.cc/FL6D-VU9A] (last visited Nov. 3, 2019); McPeak, supra note 23, at 463; Betts &
Jaep, supra note 25, at 226.
140. Terry, supra note 59, at 105.
141. Another potential method of standardizing technology competence re-
quirements, and also encouraging lawyer compliance, could include looking to
malpractice insurance providers to include technology competence and use guide-
lines in malpractice insurance policies. This approach would provide a private,
non-regulatory method for motivating appropriate behavior, and would also po-
tentially permit for requirements more closely tailored to a lawyer or law firm's
area of practice, market, and client base.
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A. Additional CLE Requirements
One potential method for providing lawyers with guidance regarding
technology competence might be to follow the route taken by Florida to
require mandatory one-hour CLE courses concerning technology. This
approach has already been taken by many state bar associations with re-
gard to ethics, mental health, and addiction in the legal profession.
While enacting additional CLE requirements may provide state bar
associations with the comfort of knowing that each lawyer within their ju-
risdiction has "checked a box" with regard to technology competence, this
approach will likely not address the concerns of transactional lawyers.
Specifically, in keeping with the Model Rules' already litigation-heavy
bent, it takes no sophisticated prognostication to predict that state bar of-
ferings concerning technology competence will be similarly litigation-ori-
ented. In fact, a quick perusal of the technology CLE offerings available
on the Florida State Bar website shows that the majority of the upcoming
technology CLE offerings focus on litigation-oriented issues.142
Further, this solution does not further the ABA's goal of including
the technology competence requirement as an inherent, structural change
to the way in which lawyers view their competence requirements. Adding
a "check-the-box" method of fulfilling a core, complex duty will surely
cause lawyers to undervalue an aspect of their practice that has both the
potential for deeply enhancing their client-service ability, and landing
them in ethical hot water. As such, adding a CLE requirement not only
fails to solve the problem of technology competence, but may in fact exac-
erbate it.
B. Potential Revisions to Comment 8
A better option for the ABA and state regulators might be to follow in
the footsteps of states like Colorado, Indiana, and New York, and edit the
technology competence Comment directly. Providing additional clarity
regarding what the term "relevant technology" encompasses may be seen
by additional states as a method of providing clarity to lawyers seeking to
fulfill their obligations. However, similar concerns expressed with regard
to the CLE requirement exist in connection with this potential approach,
as well.
First, refocusing the edits to Comment 8 to address concerns prima-
rily around "communication," as was done in Colorado, simply amplifies
the weaknesses inherent in the existing ethical guidance and enforcement
on Comment 8. The focus on data safety, storage, and transmission misses
ample opportunity for Comment 8 to serve as an impetus to use technol-
ogy to improve legal efficiency. Further, this limited edit simply does not
comport with the broad, structural change that the Commission envi-
142. THE FLORIDA BAR, CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, https://www
.floridabar.org/member/cle/#UpcomingLiveCoursesAudio [https://perma.cc/
S7MP-QK8D] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019).
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sioned in enacting the Comment. Nor do such edits recognize the ABA's
position that the requirement to obtain technological competence is in-
herent in Rule 1.1.143 If the overall requirement of competence is not
limited to keeping client files secure (which it most surely is not), then the
technology competence Comment simply should not be edited to include
this limitation.
The edits provided by New York and Indiana, however, come closer to
the mark of a helpful method of clarifying the technology competence
requirement. A focus on the lawyer's practice, as in Indiana,1 44 and the
lawyer's clients, as in New York,145 modify the term "relevant technology"
and make it more grounded in the actual concerns of lawyers arising in
their daily practice. Further, the broad structure of these edits comports
much more closely with the ideals of the Commission in their initial pro-
mulgation of Comment 8.
Nonetheless, despite New York and Indiana's valiant efforts to edit
and clarify Comment 8, problems remain with the enforceability of the
Comment itself. As discussed in Section II.B supra, the majority of states
view comments as guidance only, and New York specifically indicates that
it publishes but does not adopt the comments to the Model Rules. There-
fore, edits within Comment 8 itself may not provide a solid footing for
lawyers seeking guidance as to their ethical obligations. Further, ethics
scholars have suggested that edits to Comment 8 would require significant
time to approve and enact.14 6 Based on the speed at which change in
legal technology is occurring, changes to the text of the Comment itself
may not be the most effective means of assisting lawyers in achieving tech-
nology competence.
C. Guidance for Transactional Lawyers
In considering the shortcomings of the approaches set forth above to
provide transactional lawyers with helpful guidance to obtain and main-
tain technology competence, the idea of providing guidance in the form
of an ABA formal ethics opinion, seems to present one of the most worka-
ble alternatives.
In looking to previous ABA formal ethics opinions related to this
topic, as well as helpful opinions from other jurisdictions, such as Califor-
nia and Washington, a set of flexible guidelines presents the most worka-
ble solution. Rather than prescriptive solutions based on specific types of
technology, or specific steps lawyers must take to "check a box" for tech-
nology competence, the quandary of the transactional lawyer would better
be served by a set of guidelines describing the types of considerations that
should be made in connection with determining technology competence.
143. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
146. Simshaw, supra note 17, at 206.
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Having these guidelines come directly from the ABA, in the form of a
formal opinion, would sidestep concerns expressed above with the varying
levels of strength and enforceability granted to the comments themselves
by various state bar regulatory bodies. This approach would also provide a
consistent, if merely advisory, solution.
A list of flexible factors provided by the ABA in a formal opinion
would provide a structural solution, permitting transactional lawyers to
measure their current practices against a set of objective, non-prescriptive
suggestions for the types of technologies necessary in their practice. The
ideal set of factors would flesh out the term "relevant technology" as pro-
vided in Comment 8, giving transactional lawyers more comfort in know-
ing that adoption of specifically transactional technology can meet their
competence requirements. Core to any set of factors provided to transac-
tional lawyers must be transactional clients' needs. Keying a set of factors
to the needs of a client would also encourage the use of technology effi-
ciently, as inherent in the needs of all clients is the ideal of keeping legal
costs manageable.
A potential set of factors could include considerations such as:
* The lawyer's practice area, client needs, and the nature of the cli-
ent's transaction;
* Whether an increase in the lawyer's efficiency would be achieved
through the use of the technology;
* The safety and security of client data stored on or transmitted with
the technology, which may be analyzed by a third-party data-secur-
ity expert; and
* Client instructions, circumstances, and industry standards.
Should the ABA provide a set of flexible factors, similar to the forego-
ing, in a formal opinion, transactional lawyers would be assured that their
requirements for technology competence would not be keyed to the re-
quirements of litigation practice, nor would they be overly prescriptive,
and thereby diminish one of the most important accomplishments of the
ABA 20/20 Commission in providing Comment 8 to Rule 1.1-providing
an evolving, structural guideline for technology competence.
CONCLUSION
While no single suggestion for the enforcement or interpretation of
Comment 8 provides a perfect roadmap for the transactional lawyer seek-
ing to navigate the complex world of technology competence, each pro-
vide some insights into best practices transactional lawyers can adopt in
efforts to meet their technology competence requirement. As such, law-
yers should first and foremost abide by any and all technology competence
CLE requirements put forth by their jurisdictions, and remain up-to-speed
on all ethical enforcement or additional ethical guidelines published or
adopted in their home jurisdictions.
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However, the ABA has an opportunity to provide additional guidance
to transactional lawyers by providing flexible factors, including an assess-
ment of the client's needs, in determining whether a transactional lawyer
has attained their technology competence under Comment 8. These flexi-
ble factors would both provide comfort to transactional lawyers that they
are attaining baseline technology competence, while also providing a
means to assess whether newly developed technology could be ethically
applied to client transactions.
This dual application of a potential ABA formal opinion on technol-
ogy competence for transactional lawyers would enable innovation, while
reducing time spent on concerns of ethical compliance. The ability to
harness newly evolving technological tools will permit transactional law-
yers to survive and thrive in a landscape of relentless technological
change, while also applying their core, human lawyering skills to deal strat-
egy. Harnessing lawyers' skills while reducing billable time through the
use of enhanced technology-as an effective enforcement model for tech-
nology competence would permit-will allow lawyers to reach more cli-
ents, more effectively, thus achieving the ABA's core, structural goals in
enacting the technology competence requirement under Comment 8 to
Rule 1.1.
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 3
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65: p. 159190
